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Has democracy stalled
in Indonesia?
O L L E  T Ö R N Q U I S T
INDONESIA, after India and the
United States of America, is the third
largest, albeit fledgling, democracy in
the world, and the largest among the
new ones. Its re-emergence at the time
of the fall of the Suharto regime in
1998 remains an historical opportu-
nity of major proportions. Should this
emerging democracy stabilize and
become meaningful for the people at
large, it would not only be of direct
importance to hundreds of millions
of disempowered citizens but also
a milestone for human rights and
democracy in general.
What are the problems and
options involved? First the historical
lessons. While the ideas concerning
human rights and democracy origi-
nated in the West, it was not the West
but sections of the anti-colonial libera-
tion movement (with a majority of
Muslims involved) that brought
human rights and democracy to Indo-
nesia. Further, one needs to question
the ideological thesis of the authori-
tarian rule that earlier efforts during the
1950s to introduce liberal democracy
were abandoned since the country was
‘not modern enough’ for democracy.
In reality, the major problems were
that the small, West-oriented middle
class failed to generate popular sup-
port and opted instead for enlightened
technocracy (spearheaded by the
Socialist Party), and that the electo-
rally more successful political par-
ties (the nationalists, the two Muslim
blocs and the Communists) were more
concerned with positioning them-
selves within the framework of the
externally imposed Cold War than
with democracy.
History has also invalidated the
theory that social and economic mod-
ernization and the growth of the mid-
dle class would generate democracy.
Rapid modernization and a substan-
tially expanded middle class under
Suharto did absolutely nothing to
facilitate democracy. Neither did the
fully modernized, middle class ori-
ented and liberal democratic countries
around the world oppose the dictato-
rial regime. Very little of this changed
even as the West reduced its support
for authoritarian Latin American
regimes in the 1980s and engaged in
widespread international interven-
tion for human rights and democracy
with the end of the Cold War in 1989.
Indonesia was one of the major excep-
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tions right up to the Asian economic
and political crisis. Rather, it was
widely believed that a dynamic and
stable capitalism was being fostered
from top down, and that an elitist,
reformist and democracy-oriented
pact would be negotiable once Presi-
dent Suharto either decided to step
down or passed away.
Another lesson is that the weakness
of the previous arguments should at
least have been clear with the crack-
down on dissidents in 1996, symboli-
cally spearheaded by former President
Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati. It is
true that at that time popular resistance
against authoritarian exploitation
coincided with middle class protests
against corruption and repression, but
the protests were poorly organized
and the regime’s response under-
mined negotiated compromises. Sub-
sequently, it took only a year and a
half of unrest and repression before
international financial institutions
and foreign investors lost their trust in
the capacity of the regime to guaran-
tee the lucrative combination of primi-
tive and advanced accumulation of
capital.
‘Flexible’ investors abandoned
the scene, causing devastation to hun-
dreds of millions of ordinary people.
Yet, it was neither capital nor the sup-
posedly human rights and democracy-
oriented international community that
finally brought down Suharto, but the
‘instant’ student movement that sub-
stituted for the lack of broad popular
organization by paralyzing Jakarta
and several other cities with large-
scale protests and demonstrations.
From then on, the internation-
ally dominant model of transition to
liberal democracy through compro-
mises within the elite and skilful cons-
truction of basic rights and institutions
rose to prominence with remarkable
speed.1 Once Suharto stepped down
on 21 May 1998, most sections of
his loyal associates realized the need
to negotiate a compromise with the
moderate opposition. Dissident lea-
ders Megawati, Amien Rais and
Abdurrahman Wahid responded posi-
tively by abandoning the popular
oriented movement. The turning
point was the decision to opt for early
elections in 1999. This paralyzed the
activists who had been chiefly respon-
sible for bringing democracy to Indo-
nesia. Most of them opted instead for
sustained direct action within civil
society.2
The final lesson is that neither the
results of the elitist strategy nor direct
civic actions have been impressive.
Just as with many other new demo-
cracies in the South and the former
Eastern Bloc,3 the elitist model of
democracy has generated some impor-
tant civil and political rights as well
as technically free and fair elections.
Ordinary people are still unable, how-
ever, to use political means to fight
their economic and social deprivation,
and the problem of corruption has
probably increased within the frame-
work of decentralization and the
increasingly powerful political parties
and legislative assemblies.
The territorial organization of
the 70 per cent ‘self-financed’ military
has been sustained, while much of the
previous state repression is being
‘outsourced’ to semi-private militias
and other security groups. The pact-
making elite have largely remained
unable to form stable, trustworthy and
effective governments. As a conse-
quence, in the 2004 general elections
the well organized, semi-sectarian
Muslim party, Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera (PKS), rose from marginal
status to gain more than 7% of the
national vote, becoming the largest
party in the capital region.  Moreover,
the old elite dressed up in conserva-
tive populism was returned to domi-
nance behind the new president,
managerial retired general, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), with
successful Suharto-era businessman
Jusuf Kalla as his ambitious deputy.
In contrast, the poorly organized
students, NGOs and uncoordinated
groups of labourers, farmers and
urban poor were soon demobilized,
humiliated and confined to politically
marginalized civil society activity.
According to a comprehensive review
and comparative case study pro-
gramme on and with the post-Suharto
democracy movement,4 although
many protest groups and activists
were still active they continued to
reflect Suharto’s ‘floating mass’ poli-
1. For a basic text, see William R. Liddle,
(ed.), Crafting Indonesian Democracy. PPW-
LIPI, Ford Foundation and Mizan Pustaka,
Jakarta, 2001.
2. For a general analysis, see O. Törnquist,
‘Dynamics of Indonesian Democratisation’,
Third World Quarterly 21(3), 2000, 383-423.
3. For general analyses, see e.g. J. Grugel,
Democratization: A Critical Introduc-
tion. Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002; Rita
Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Deve-
lopment Discourse and Good Governance in
Africa. Zed Books, London and New York,
2000; Marina Ottaway, Democracy Chal-
lenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington D.C., 2003; Thomas Carothers,
‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Jour-
nal of Democracy 13(1), 2002, and Confront-
ing the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties
in New Democracies. Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Washington DC.
Also Olle Törnquist, Popular Development
and Democracy: Case Studies in the Philip-
pines, Indonesia and Kerala. SUM and
UNRISD, Oslo and Geneva, and ‘The Politi-
cal Deficit of Substantial Democratisation’ in
John Harriss, Kristian Stokke and Olle
Törnquist (eds), Politicising Democracy: The
New Local Politics of Democratisation.
Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2004.
4. A. Prasetyo Stanley, A.E. Priyono and
O. Törnquist, Indonesia’s Post-Suharto
Democracy Movement. Demos and NIAS,
Jakarta, 2003.
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tics – fragmented and isolated from
ordinary people – and thus unable to
make much headway in the new
democratic politics beyond their lob-
bying and pressure group type civil
society activities. In the 2004 elec-
tions, it was only the semi-sectarian
PKS that included some representa-
tion from the movement that had
given birth to democracy. The risk is
thus (to paraphrase Gramsci) that
while the old is dying and the new
cannot be born, morbid symptoms
will appear.
What is less clear, however, is how
this victorious transition paradigm
has failed to produce expected results,
how the pro-democrats have failed to
generate a viable alternative, and what
should be done instead.
To find out, Demos (The Centre
for Democracy and Human Rights
Studies) has developed a comprehen-
sive framework for assessing the
problems and options of power and
democracy. During 2003-2004, 800
carefully selected, experienced and
reflective pro-democracy experts
around the country were asked some
300 questions about (a) the perform-
ance, spread and substance of the
means of democracy as well as (b) the
will and capacity of the most impor-
tant actors to promote and use them.
Thematic follow up studies have been
added and a general resurvey is under
way.5
There are four major conclu-
sions from the survey. First, that
several years of important civil and
political freedoms, elections, and craft-
ing of institutions has not yet gener-
ated operational tools to facilitate
the rule of law, equal access to justice,
basic social and economic rights, and
representative and accountable gov-
ernment. Second, that the most funda-
mental problem is not bad governance
and socio-economic inequalities but
poor popular control of public affairs
through trustworthy representation –
that is, if one prefers to fight corrup-
tion and exploitation in a democratic
way. Third, that the major reason for
the poor representation, in turn, is
the monopolization of the economy
and organized politics by wider and
more localized but still dominant
elite groups. Fourth, that the main
problem of fighting this is that the
democracy movement remains frag-
mented, socially ‘floating’ and politi-
cally marginalized.
The crucial political dynamics stands
out as a triangular one between domi-
nant actors with powers and interests
related to (a) the ‘decapitated’ post-
Suharto state at the top, thus being
weakened, fragmented and localized,
(b) the increasingly strong religi-
ous and other communal forces, and
(c) the equally reinforced
interests related to private
business and market, in each
of the fundamental corners.
None of the actors is
rooted only in ‘its own’ cor-
ner – but horse-trade in all
directions. In fact, an unholy
alliance is the strongest. The
first party to the alliance is
the religious and other
communitarian groups, who
reduce the public sphere in
favour of, for instance, reli-
giously prescribed moral
rules and values upheld by the
husband, family, and religious
leaders. The second party is
the pro-business and market
groups that privatize public resources
in favour of the market, corporate
institutions, self-management by
‘responsible citizens’ (for instance
the villa owners in a residential area)
and the individuals themselves. The
loudspeakers on top of the mosques
and in the shopping malls do not speak
the same language, but the tendency
as well as the high volume is the same.
Meanwhile, both parties retain of
course their increasingly informal
control of patches of the ‘decapitated’
state.
Worse, despite attempts at building
democracy, most relations between
state and people are increasingly
being mediated by these forces. While
the previously matching authorita-
rian top-down linkages under Suharto
have disintegrated, the earlier pre-
dominance of clientelism and popu-
lism is back in full swing. In addition,
the personality-oriented populism
under President Yudhoyono and a
large number of similarly elected gov-
ernors, mayors and regents is much
more conservative and money-driven
than the classical rural-romantic
brand of founding father, Sukarno.
5. O. Törnquist, A.E. Priyono and W.P.
Samadhi, ‘Making Democracy Meaningful.
Problems and Options in Indonesia.’ Demos,
Jakarta, 2007. For a briefer version Olle
Törnquist (2006). ‘Assessing Democracy
from Below: A Framework and Indonesian
Pilot Study’, Democratization 13(2), April
2006, pp. 227-255. For Demos’ additional
reports visit www.demosindonesia.org
FIGURE I
Current Relations Between Indonesia’s Centres of
Power and Their Links to People
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Most important, there is nothing to
substitute for the old and eliminated
but comparatively modern commu-
nist led popular movements. In short,
the independent civic-political links
between state and people that are
intrinsic to democracy remain criti-
cally weak.
In short, democracy is squeezed.
The powerful groups tend to reinforce
the triangular alliances and little can
be done by people themselves. The
independent links between state and
people (for instance through popular
controlled parties and interest organi-
zations) are very weak. Most relations
between the state and the people
are mediated through communita-
rian groups and the business and mar-
ket, thus cementing clientelism and
corruption.
What can be done? Since the Demos
survey was carried out, the problem of
elitist rather than popular representa-
tion has become even more obvious.
By now it is not just our local experts
on democracy who say that the parties
are undemocratic and do not represent
the major cleavages and interests
among the population. According to
a recent opinion poll, two-thirds of
ordinary people agree. Similarly,
when finally given a chance to express
their opinion in a democratic way, the
Aceh people denounced the so-called
national parties and voted for locally
rooted representatives. Most recently,
protests are mounting in Jakarta
against the moneyed political selec-
tion of candidates in the gubernato-
rial race.
The pro-democrats face grim
realities. The Demos survey clearly
shows that most of them remain
almost as socially floating in the pub-
lic discourse, without firm roots among
the people at large, as the masses were
meant to be politically floating in the
villages under Suharto.
While it was easy to conclude
from the survey that priority should be
given to the problem of representation
and that the democracy movement
should use its advances in civil society
to reclaim its political influence, it was
difficult to say how this could be done.
This calls for further studies of the two
major aspects involved: (a) the need
to expand public resources, and (b) the
need to strengthen the linkages
between on the one hand civic and
popular organizations and organized
politics on the other.
A s Mushtaq Khan reminds us, there
must be substantial public resources
to share for a reasonably meaningful
democracy to make sense.6 If not,
religious and other forms of commu-
nitarianism and clientelism will flour-
ish as much as the dominant forces on
the market. While the well-endowed
may buy their freedom on the market,
the neo-liberal hollowing out of pub-
lic resources and governance sustains
the incorporation of ordinary people
into politics through clientelism and
populism as less public resources
make them even more dependent
on fixers, patrons and communita-
rian ‘solidarity’. At the same time,
pro-democratic promotion of public
solutions to people’s problems and
programmatic platforms for pro-poor
policies are considered fine but unre-
alistic. To win an election one rather
has to promise special favours and
patronage. Meanwhile civic organiza-
tions are miserable vote-catchers,
resorting instead to pressure politics
and lobbying.
As a consequence, self-help
programmes gain importance. Some
of them are civic but most are com-
munitarian and primarily Muslim-
oriented. While several of them are
vital to the people affected, the house-
holds and individuals who have some
resources are separated from those
who have less; and even the poor are
fragmented in different projects and
communities. In addition, it is difficult
to reconcile the self-help efforts with
the principle of political equality and
basic public rights.
Perhaps it is possible instead to
seek inspiration from comparative
studies suggesting that struggles for
democratic regulations may serve
as a realistic and unifying supplemen-
tary framework; a framework sustain-
ing principles of universal social
and economic rights and bringing
self-management in line with demo-
cratic political equality and imparti-
ality without engaging in unrealistic
demands for full public ownership
and control.
Yet, this is easier said than done. Par-
ticipatory budgeting or decentralized
people’s planning, for instance, is not
possible to introduce only by design
but calls for political change and
facilitation.7 Post-colonial countries
like Indonesia continue to suffer from
uneven development. On the one hand,
the state is no longer strong even if
it may still be big. On the other, the
advanced sectors of capital and mid-
dle classes are rarely progressive.
Rather, they benefit from the under-
developed poor sectors and from
primitive accumulation through coer-
cion and dominance, in symbiotic
relation with state and communitarian
based groups.
The established strategies to
alter this stalemate are democratically
6. Mushtaq H. Khan, ‘Markets, States and
Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the
Case for Democracy in Developing Coun-
tries’, Democratization 12(5), December
2005, pp. 707-724.
7. Cf. John Harriss, Kristian Stokke and
Olle Törnquist (eds), Politicising Demo-
cracy: The New Local Politics of Democrati-
sation. Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke,
2004.
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unviable. To begin with, previous
attempts under Sukarno at state-led
‘national democratic development’
served to undermine rather than
strengthen democracy and have now
been invalidated by capitalist globali-
zation. Moreover, as we know, the
worldwide idea during the ‘third wave
of democracy’ of crafting institutions
to turn powerful actors into democrats
has proved as insufficient in Indone-
sia as in other new democracies since
the powerful actors avoid or hijack
the new rules of the game.
In addition, the efforts to prioritize
the shaping of a liberal European-like
rechtsstaat by way of ‘good govern-
ance reforms’ ahead of further demo-
cratization, as frequently argued by
the IMF and World Bank,8 suffer from
the weakness of liberal oriented bour-
geois and middle classes. Hence,
the more likely call for more or less
authoritarian solutions, akin to the
recent royal-military and urban mid-
dle class coup in Thailand. Nor is there
a reasonably democratic developmen-
tal state at hand that can generate more
public resources through pro-business
policies.9
Worse, the pro-democracy acti-
vists have almost nothing to offer in
terms of a realistic alternative. The
recent admiration for Latin American
nationalist Hugo Chavez neither con-
siders his top-down populism as well
as unique military backing and oil
resources; nor is it relevant beyond
the struggle against international
finance capital and foreign dominance
of natural resources. The crucial issues
of how to fight and build an alterna-
tive to the symbiosis between state,
communitarianism and private busi-
ness in order to increase economic
growth for more public resources and
thus demonopolize democracy, are
almost as neglected as during the
hegemony of the radical nationalists
in the late fifties and early sixties.10
The major popular alternative is
Muslim aspirations for a value-based
welfare state. The general thesis (from
for instance Turkey, Egypt, Iran and
Malaysia) seems to be that the prob-
lems of development and democracy
are due to insufficient moral values in
local communities and families,
which paves the way for individu-
alistic greediness, corruption and
exploitative and western dominated
neo-liberal capitalism. Consequently,
the public democratic sphere with
extensive liberal freedoms should be
reduced in favour of religiously gov-
erned ethic codes, community and
family relations. This kind of privati-
zation may help contain the neo-
liberal and exploitative alternatives.
For instance, there are social welfare
policies with roots in community con-
tribution and redistribution (the inter-
nationally best know case of which is
probably Hamas), cooperatives and
the interest free Islamic banking sys-
tem. Beyond these restrictions, how-
ever, free and fair elections may still
apply.
The fact that this thinking is
quickly gaining ground in Indonesia
is obviously related to the western cru-
sades in the Middle East and the fail-
ure of the other perspectives to make
democracy meaningful for ordinary
people after the Asian economic cri-
sis and the fall of the Suharto regime.
Yet, it is a weak alternative. The prob-
lem is more than a shrinking of the
public sphere and the use of illiberal
measures. In addition, most of the
radical Muslim’s comparatively
impressive anti-corruption and social
welfare measures are meditated bet-
ween state and people through com-
munities and patron-client relations
rather than directly through impartial
institutions facilitated by civic par-
ties and interest organizations. This
breeds rivalries, tends to undermine
the anti-corruption efforts and reduces
the pro-democratic potential. There
is also no strategy against the unholy
alliances between the communitarian
elite on the one hand and both the state
and private business at central and
local levels on the other.
In brief, efforts at fostering represen-
tation of potentially powerful agents
in favour of an alternative develop-
ment project for more public resources
seem to rest with the pro-democrats.
If there are no advances in this respect,
meaningful democracy is likely to be
a lost case. The historical and present
attempts in countries like Brazil,
South Africa and those in Scandina-
via and provinces like West Bengal
where international economic compe-
tition cannot be avoided, seem to
focus on strong actors among capital
and labour that can agree on produc-
tion-oriented economic development
in return for public resources to pro-
mote general social and economic
rights and welfare policies – negoti-
ated, generalized and governed by
popular organizations, employers’
organizations and the government.
In Indonesia, however, there is little
8. See www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
For a blunt introduction on the Indonesian
discourse, see Guido Tabellini, ’Economic
Reforms Precede Democracy’, Jakarta Post,
15 September 2005.
9. Major weaknesses in the former mentioned
article by Khan, op.cit.
10. For an analysis of the problems of the
Indonesian radicals in this respect, see Olle
Törnquist, Dilemmas of Third World Commu-
nism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indone-
sia. Zed, London, 1984, and for comparisons
with India, see Olle Törnquist, What’s Wrong
with Marxism? Vo.1: On Capitalists and
State in India and Indonesia. Vol.2: On Peas-
ants and Workers in India and Indonesia.
Manohar, New Delhi,  1989 and 1991. 11. See www.demosindonesia.org
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interest in this route. Hence, the play-
ing field is left open for the unholy
alliance between Muslim communita-
rianism and neo-liberalism.
For a start this requires that the civic
pro-democrats are able to strengthen
their position. Demos has thus fol-
lowed up the national survey by stud-
ies of attempts among popular
organizations and civil society groups
to move ahead.11 For instance, partici-
patory surveys on the regency level as
well as comparative studies of experi-
ments to combine civil and political
work indicate that many grassroots
organizations now try to broaden their
special agendas, cooperate and ‘go
political’. Unfortunately, this is still
hampered by elitism, money politics,
special interests (including among
workers) as well as by different prio-
rities amid groups that either try to
resist subordination, revitalize old
customs, or reform democratic insti-
tutions.
Additional case studies of
attempts by pro-democrats to make a
difference in direct elections of gov-
ernors, mayors and regents point to
major challenges of financing politi-
cal activities, in selecting candidates
and holding them accountable on the
basis of ‘political contracts’. Some of
these problems could be tackled in
Aceh when it became possible to
launch candidates based on locally
rooted movements rather than the
political elite. Yet, while the move-
ments were strong enough to stand up
against Jakarta, the organized repre-
sentation of social and economic
interests was weak. Hence, vital social
and economic questions about rebuild-
ing the province were set aside, thus
remaining confined to technocratic
and corporatist arrangements.
There are a number of strategies to
handle these difficulties of scaling up
and building popular representation.
Some prefer to build links between
people and executives, thus avoiding
‘rotten’ politicians. Others say this is
only appropriate for single issues,
does not alter the relations of power
and avoids the problems of represen-
tation. Hence, they would rather turn
to politicians and parties to gather
support and ‘promote unity’ among
grounded organizations and move-
ments. In the worst case, the former
path thus sustains the separa-
tion between direct action and
representation, while the sec-
ond path generates new layers
of top-down political frag-
mentation among popular and
civil organizations of the kind
that is so common and devas-
tating in India.
What should be done?
The Demos studies point to the
need for pro-democratic non-
party political blocs, based on
participatory political map-
ping and thus developed local
and federated mini-platforms.
This seems to be the interme-
diary level where popular and
civil organizations can engage,
cooperate, develop joint political edu-
cation, keep politicians and parties
accountable and prevent top-down
party fragmentation of  their activities.
Pro-democracy parties and politi-
cians, in turn, who support the mini-
platforms, can gain broad backing
from individual (but not organiza-
tional) members behind comprehen-
sive programmes.
Meanwhile, however, the diminish-
ing trust in established parties obvi-
ously represents such a serious threat
against vested interests that new laws
and regulations are introduced to con-
tain rather than support efforts at more
popular representation. Local parties
in Aceh will be prevented from par-
ticipating in national politics (so why
should they then stay within Indone-
sia?). Popular and civil organizations
elsewhere will find it almost impos-
sible to form more genuine parties
and engage in elections. The first item
on the agenda for a pro-democracy
bloc in Indonesia is thus obvious: As
the problem is too much elitism, and
insufficient popular participation,
there is a need to open the system, not
close it!
Consequently, Indonesian demo-
crats need to worry less about the
negative impact of Islam and neo-
liberalism and more about the basic
hindrances to meaningful democracy.
To overcome these hurdles, the pri-
mary need is to politically strengthen
equal citizenship and representa-
tive links directly between people
and politics. As this gains ground,
pro-democratic regulations may help
contain communitarianism, turn self-
management more politically equal,
and foster public welfare oriented
growth. The basic changes that seem
to be needed in order to transform the
democratically destructive dynamics
into more productive ones are indi-
cated in Figure II.
FIGURE II
Possible Transformation of Indonesia’s Centres of
Power and Their Links to People
